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Abstract—In Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) net-
works, smart meters should send fine-grained power consumption
readings to electric utilities to perform real-time monitoring and
energy management. However, these readings can leak sensi-
tive information about consumers’ activities. Various privacy-
preserving schemes for collecting fine-grained readings have been
proposed for AMI networks. These schemes aggregate individual
readings and send an aggregated reading to the utility, but
they extensively use asymmetric-key cryptography which involves
large computation/communication overhead. Furthermore, they
do not address End-to-End (E2E) data integrity, authenticity,
and computing electricity bills based on dynamic prices. In this
paper, we propose EPIC, an efficient and privacy-preserving
data collection scheme with E2E data integrity verification for
AMI networks. Using efficient cryptographic operations, each
meter should send a masked reading to the utility such that all
the masks are canceled after aggregating all meters’ masked
readings, and thus the utility can only obtain an aggregated
reading to preserve consumers’ privacy. The utility can verify
the aggregated reading integrity without accessing the individual
readings to preserve privacy. It can also identify the attackers
and compute electricity bills efficiently by using the fine-grained
readings without violating privacy. Furthermore, EPIC can resist
collusion attacks in which the utility colludes with a relay node
to extract the meters’ readings. A formal proof, probabilistic
analysis are used to evaluate the security of EPIC, and ns-3 is
used to implement EPIC and evaluate the network performance.
In addition, we compare EPIC to existing data collection schemes
in terms of overhead and security/privacy features.
Index Terms—Smart Grid, AMI Networks, Privacy Preserva-
tion, Data Integrity, Collusion Resistance, and Dynamic Pricing.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE current power grid is unreliable, inefficient, and a ma-jor pollutant to the environment. Recent reports indicated
that the power outages cost the United States (U.S.) at least
150 billion dollars each year [1]. Also, the north-east blackout
in August 2003, which lasted for a week, affected over 100
power plants and about 55 million people [2]. Investigations
showed that this blackout could be avoided if the grid could
provide effective real-time diagnostic support [3].
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The smart grid initiative aims to develop a clean, reliable,
and efficient system. It extensively integrates information and
communication technologies into the power grid [4]. One
of the main components of the smart grid is the Advanced
Metering Infrastructure (AMI) networks that connect smart
meters (SMs) installed at consumers’ side to the electric
service provider (the utility). SMs should send fine-grained
power consumption data to the utility to perform real-time
monitoring and energy management [5]. Moreover, the utility
can reduce the power consumption during peak hours using
dynamic pricing approach in which the electricity prices may
change during the day to encourage consumers to reduce their
power consumption.
However, the fine-grained power consumption readings can
reveal sensitive information about the consumers’ activities,
such as the times consumers leave/return homes, as well as,
the appliances they use since each appliance has a unique
power consumption signature [6]–[8]. Privacy-preserving data
aggregation is a promising technique to enable the utility
to obtain an aggregated fine-grained reading from an AMI
network without learning the individual readings to preserve
the consumers’ privacy. However, the existing schemes, such
as [9]–[13], extensively use asymmetric-key cryptography in
data aggregation, which typically involves large computation
and communication overhead. They also do not address End-
to-End (E2E) data integrity in which the utility can ensure that
all the individual fine-grained readings are not altered during
transmission and aggregation without accessing the individual
readings to preserve privacy. Moreover, they do not address
E2E authenticity in which the utility can ensure that the
aggregated reading is computed using the fine-grained readings
coming from intended consumers. Furthermore, generating
electricity bills using the reported fine-grained readings based
on dynamic prices is challenging since the utility should not
have access to the fine-grained readings to preserve privacy,
but these readings are needed to generate consumers’ bills.
In this paper, we propose an Efficient Privacy-preserving
scheme with E2E data Integrity, authenticity and Collusion-
resistance for AMI networks, named “EPIC”. The idea is that
each SM selects a number of SMs in the network called “prox-
ies” and efficiently computes shared pairwise secret masks
with each proxy. Then, it should mask its fine-grained reading
with all the masks shared with the proxies, such that all the
masks are canceled after aggregating all meters’ masked read-
ings, and thus the utility can only obtain an aggregated reading
to preserve consumers’ privacy. EPIC can also resist collusion
ar
X
iv
:1
81
0.
01
85
1v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  3
 O
ct 
20
18
2attacks in which the utility can collude with a relay meter
to extract a meter’s fine-grained readings because readings
are masked by several secret masks shared with a number of
different proxies. The number of the selected proxies controls
the protection level against collusion attack. In addition, to
ensure E2E data integrity and authenticity, a homomorphic
hash and a hash MAC are computed on each masked reading.
Then, hash MACs are aggregated while all the individual
homomorphic hashes are forwarded to the utility. Using the
individual homomorphic hashes and the aggregated MAC, the
utility can ensure the data integrity of each individual fine-
grained reading and the authenticity of each consumer in the
network. Furthermore, the homomorphic hashes can be also
used to enable the utility to generate dynamic electricity bills
without accessing the individual readings to preserve privacy.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
• Efficient and collusion-resistant privacy-preserving
power consumption collection. EPIC uses secure and
lightweight operations to efficiently mask the fine-grained
readings and aggregate the masked readings to enable
the utility to collect a fine-grained aggregated reading
without leaking the consumers’ sensitive information.
It can also resist collusion attacks to reveal a meter’s
readings and allows the SMs to set their protection level.
• E2E data integrity. Since the meters’ reading can be
modified during the transmission to the utility, EPIC
enables the utility to verify the integrity of the aggre-
gated reading without accessing the individual readings
to preserve consumers’ privacy. It also enables the utility
to identify the attackers who modify the readings.
• E2E authenticity. In EPIC, the utility can ensure that the
aggregated reading was computed by the intended users
in the network.
• Dynamic pricing. Using homomorphic hash properties,
EPIC enables the utility to efficiently compute electricity
bills based on dynamic pricing without violating con-
sumers’ privacy.
The results of a formal proof, probabilistic modeling, and
analysis demonstrate that EPIC is secure. In addition, ns-3
is used to implement EPIC and evaluate the network perfor-
mance. The results demonstrate that our scheme is efficient.
We also compare EPIC to the existing data collection schemes
in terms of overhead and security/privacy features.
A preliminary version of this paper appeared in [14]. The
main difference between the conference version and the cur-
rent version are as follows. First, [14] did not address E2E data
integrity, E2E authenticity, attacker identification, dynamic
pricing, and details of key management and sharing secret
masks offline and efficiently. The journal version addresses
all these challenges. Second, extensive analysis and simulation
have been added to the journal version. This includes a formal
security proof, a comprehensive security analysis, probabilistic
analysis of the collusion attacks and the proposed defense
method, and updated ns-3 simulation results against similar
existing schemes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II discusses the related works. The system models and prelim-
inaries are presented in section III. The proposed masking and
aggregation method is presented in section IV. The details of
EPIC are given in section V. The security and privacy analysis
is given in section VI, whereas the performance evaluation
and experimental results are given in section VII. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in section VIII.
II. RELATED WORKS
Cryptographic and non-cryptographic schemes have been
proposed to collect power consumption readings in AMI
networks with the preservation of consumer privacy. Non-
cryptographic schemes hide the real power consumption using
a rechargeable battery that modifies consumption patterns
[15]. However, this approach is costly because it requires
installing batteries at consumer sides and regularly maintaining
them. For cryptographic schemes, the existing schemes use
anonymization or data aggregation to preserve privacy.
Anonymization. The anonymization schemes aim to hide the
real identity of the senders of the power consumption readings.
In [16], messages should follow different routes to the utility
every time the meter reports its reading to hide the sender
of the messages. In [17], short-term pseudonyms are used to
anonymize the data sender. However, since readings are sent
every short time, the utility can link the readings of each meter,
which degrades consumer privacy.
Data aggregation. Comparing to anonymization and non-
cryptographic techniques, data aggregation is a practical and
cheap approach for achieving high level privacy preservation.
In the literature, data aggregation is used in AMI and wireless
sensor networks (WSNs) [9]–[13], [18]–[20]. In [9], Fan et al.
use bilinear pairing with an aggregation method based on blind
factors and solving the discrete log problem using Pollard’s
lambda method to obtain the aggregated reading and achieve
collusion resistance.
In [10], Lu et al. used homomorphic encryption to aggregate
multi-dimensional data represented using a superincreasing
sequence. Shen et al. in [11] proposed cube-data aggregation
by using the Paillier cryptosystem and Horners Rule. In [12],
Li et al. proposed the use of two superincreasing sequences
with the Paillier cryptosystem to achieve multi-subset data
aggregation.
In [13], Li et. al. used homomorphic-encryption-based ag-
gregation scheme to send an aggregated reading to the utility.
The utility should run anomaly detection system in every data
collection round to detect data modification attack, but unlike
EPIC, the system suffers from false positive and negatives.
In [19] Garcia et al. combined Paillier’s homomorphic
encryption with additive secret sharing scheme to protect the
scheme against collusion attacks. However, the encryption
and aggregation complexities of [19] are O(n) and O(n2)
respectively while in EPIC they are O(1) and O(n). In [20],
Li et. al. used homomorphic MAC and homomorphic hash
functions to provide data integrity in WSNs against external
attackers only with the assumption that all internal nodes
are trusted. Compared to EPIC, homomorphic encryption
based aggregation schemes such as [10]–[13], [18], [19] are
inefficient as they require much larger size ciphertext and
much more time for encryption, decryption, and aggregation
than EPIC.
3TABLE I
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PROPOSED SCHEME AND RELATED SCHEMES.
EPIC [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Privacy Preservation
√ √ √ √ √ √
Efficient Aggregation
√
NA NA NA NA NA
E2E Data Integrity & √
NA NA NA NA NA∗
Attacker Identification
Collusion Resistance
√ √
NA NA
√
NA
Support Dynamic Pricing
√
NA NA NA NA NA
NA: Not Addressed
∗: Unlike EIPC that uses cryptography to detect data modification, [13]
depends on anomaly detection to verify the data, which is vulnerable to
false positives and negatives.
Different from homomorphic-encryption-based aggregation
schemes, secure multi-party computation (SMC) based aggre-
gation schemes were developed to achieve privacy through
aggregation. SMC was introduced first in [21] where each node
splits its data into k blocks such that the sum of all k blocks
is equal to the nodes’ value. Then, it randomly selects k − 1
other nodes and sends to each of them a distinctive block.
The receiving nodes should aggregate the blocks it receives
and transmits the result to the next node and so on. In [22],
Danezis et al. use SMC for computing non-linear functions
such as multiplication, mean and variance for smart grid.
Conventionally, SMC incurs high communication overhead
and transmitting shares to all other network nodes which affect
the scheme scalability.
In [23], Knirsch et al. proposed the use of one-time masking
for privacy-preserving data aggregation. Specifically, in each
data collection round, the SMs are arranged in a ring-based
topology to sequentially update the smart meter masks before
masking each fine-grained reading. However, the proposed
scheme has several limitations. First, [23] can only sup-
port single-hop model with a ring-topology communication
used for online masks agreement, while EPIC can support
both single- and multi-hop models with efficient and offline
mask agreement as will be explained later in section III and
section IV. Second, in each data collection round in [23],
all the ring SMs must communicate sequentially to ensure
the correctness of masks updates before the actual reading
reporting to the utility begins. This, therefore, increases the
time required by the utility to collect the fine-grained readings
and limits the network scalability.
Homomorphic linear authenticators (HLAs) [24] have been
widely used to achieve data integrity for cloud applications
[25], [26]. In cloud-based applications, each user breaks its
data into several blocks, uses its private key to generate an
authentication tag for each block and stores the data blocks
and authentication tags on a cloud server. For data retrieval, a
verifier sends a random challenge to the server and then uses
the server response along with the users’ public keys to ensure
data integrity. Therefore, in cloud-based applications, data
is not relayed by other users, instead, the data modification
attacks can be launched by the cloud server. Different from
HLA-based schemes [25], [26], EPIC considers a different
network and threat models in which data is relayed by other
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Fig. 1. The considered network models.
SMs in the AMI network who may launch data modification
attacks. Unlike [25], [26], EPIC ensures data integrity by using
the lightweight homomorphic hash along with an aggregated
hash MAC to ensure data integrity as will be explained in
subsection V-D and subsubsection VI-B1.
To sum up, we compare in Table I EPIC against similar
schemes. To the best of our knowledge, EPIC is the first
solution that aims to achieve efficiency, privacy preservation,
hop-by-hop and E2E data integrity and attackers identification,
high resistance to collusion attacks, and dynamic pricing based
billing simultaneously for both single- and multi-hop network
models.
III. SYSTEM MODELS AND PRELIMINARIES
A. Network Model
As shown in Fig. 1, the considered network model consists
of the utility and service subscribers in a residential area. Each
subscriber’s house is equipped with a SM to report real-time
fine-grained power consumption readings to the utility every
short time interval. SMs can communicate with the utility
through a local collector, called gateway. As shown in the
figure, EPIC can be used in single-hop or multi-hop network
models. The SMs are connected via a wireless mesh network
using Wi-Fi where each meter can act as a router to relay
meters’ packets to connect them to the gateway. The gateway
can communicate to the utility through a wired link with low
delay and high bandwidth. For the single-hop model, SMs
send reading packets to the gateway which aggregates all the
readings, create a new packet, and send it to the utility. For
the multi-hop model, a virtual minimum spanning tree network
topology that allows bottom-up aggregation is built. Then, leaf
SMs send their readings packets to their parent SM which
uses its reading and the packets received from children SMs
4to create a new packet and forwards it to the next parent SM.
This should continue until the utility receives a reading packet.
B. Adversary Model
Attackers could be external adversaries A, or internal net-
work nodes, such as SMs, the gateway, or the utility. Attackers
may attempt to invade the consumers’ privacy to learn their
power consumption patterns. They may also try to breach the
data integrity by modifying other meters’ data. In addition, A
can eavesdrop on all the communications between the different
parties to infer any sensitive information about consumers. A
can also launch some active attacks such as packet replay and
impersonation. Moreover, the attackers can work individually
or collude to launch stronger attacks.
C. Preliminaries
1) Bilinear Pairing: Let G1 be an additive cyclic group,
G2 be a multiplicative cyclic group of the same prime order
q, and P be a generator of G1. A pairing eˆ : G1 ×G1 → G2
has the following properties.
• Bilinearity: eˆ(aP, bQ) = eˆ(P, abQ) = eˆ(abP,Q) =
eˆ(P,Q)ab ∈ G2 ∀ P,Q ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z∗q .
• Non-degeneracy: eˆ(P, P ) 6= 1G2 .
• Computability: eˆ(P,Q) is efficiently computable ∀
P,Q ∈ G1.
2) Homomorphic Hash Function: Let G be an additive
cyclic group of prime order p and has d random generators
{P1, P2, . . . , Pd} ∈ G. A homomorphic hashing on message
m = {m1,m2, . . . ,md} can be constructed as
H(m) def=
d∑
i=1
miPi
Homomorphic hash function is collision resistant, where it is
infeasible to find m1 and m2 such that H(m1) = H(m2).
In addition, homomorphic hash function is one way, where
given H(m1), it is infeasible to compute m1. Homomorphic
hash function also has the following property: H(m1+m2) =
H(m1) +H(m2). We refer to reference [27] for more details
on homomorphic hash functions.
IV. EFFICIENT AND COLLUSION-RESISTANT
AGGREGATION
In this section, we present a collusion-resistant and efficient
data aggregation technique that is used in EPIC. We refer to
Table II for the main notations and parameters that will be
used in this paper.
A. Data Masking
Masked Readings. Fig. 2 illustrates the approach we use to
protect consumer privacy and resist collusion attacks by using
secret masks. First, SMi chooses α proxies {Pi,1, . . . ,Pi,α}
and shares a secret mask value s(tx)i,j with each proxy Pi,j to
be used for reporting the reading of time slot tx. As shown
in the figure, each proxy Pi,j should add the mask s(tx)i,j to its
fine-grained reading rj , whereas SMi masks its fine-grained
TABLE II
MAIN NOTATIONS.
Symbol Meaning
SMi Smart Meter i
SMpi Parent of Smart Meter i
`i Total number of meters in SMi subtree
ni Number of direct children of SMi
c Children of SMi (1 6 c 6 ni)
σi Signature generated by SMi
ri Fine-grained reading of SMi
si,j Secret mask shared between SMi and Pi,j
mi Masked reading of SMi
Mi Aggregated masked readings for SMi subtree
hi Homomorphic hash on masked reading of SMi
xi ,Yi private and public key of SMi
Ki,j Symmetric key between node i and node j
HMACKi,u (h) A keyed hash function on h
maci,u HMAC Ki,u (hi)
MACi Aggregated MAC computed by SMi
Pi,j Proxy j of SMi
αi Number of proxies selected by SMi
βi Number of nodes that selected SMi as a proxy
λi Total number of SMi proxies, λi = αi + βi
q,G1,G2, P, eˆ Public parameters of bilinear pairing
{P1, ..., Pd},G,H Public parameters of homomorphic hash
reading ri by subtracting the summation of all shared masks
with its proxies. After aggregating all masked readings sent
by SMi and its proxies, the masks added by all proxies cancel
the mask used by SMi. If all the SMs follow this masking
technique, the resultant value after the aggregation should be
the summation of all fine-grained readings. Masks are used to
achieve privacy preservation and collusion resistance as will
be explained in section VI.
Mask Calculation. Each mask shared between a SM and
each proxy should be used one time so that the masked
readings look different even if the same reading is reported
multiple time. In addition, without changing the mask, the
subtraction of two consecutive masked readings of a leaf SM
can reveal the change in the power consumption by that SM. In
EPIC, masks can be computed offline and efficiently as follows:
s
(tx)
i,j = HMACK(s)i,j
(Yi, Yj , day, tx), where HMACKsi,j () is a
keyed hash function and K(s)i,j is a short-time symmetric key
that can be computed by the procedure that is explained in the
next subsection, Yi and Yj are the public keys of the meter
SMi and the proxy Pi,j respectively, day is a unique day’s
date, and tx is a sequence number of the readings of one day.
Obviously, no other entity can derive the masks because it
does not know the shared key.
B. Efficient Key Agreement Procedure
Each meter needs to share a key with each proxy to
efficiently calculate the secret mask. Key renewal is a good
practice to thwart cryptanalysis attacks. In this subsection,
we describe two key agreement procedures to establish long-
term and short-term keys. Initially, a long-term symmetric seed
key Ki,j , shared between SMi and its proxy Pi,j should be
established and refreshed over a long period. Then, a short-
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Fig. 3. Long-term key establishment procedure.
term key K(s)i,j is efficiently computed using the long-term seed
key.
1) Long-term seed key agreement: To share a long-term
seed key Ki,j with each proxy Pi,j , SMi chooses a random
element vi,j ∈ Z∗q and composes a key establishment request
(KEReq) packet as shown in Fig. 3. The packet contains idi,
vi,jP , TSi, σi and certi, where, idi is the identifier of SMi,
TSi is the current timestamp, vi,jP is the random element
vi,j multiplied by the generator P of the additive group G1,
σi is a signature and σi = xiH2 (idi, vi,jP, TSi), H2 is a
hash function defined as H2:{0, 1}∗ → G1, and certi is the
certificate of SMi. Finally, SMi sends the KEReq packet to its
proxies. Each proxy Pi,j verifies that the packet is not stale by
checking the timestamp (TSi) to thwart replay attacks. Then,
Pi,j uses SMi’s public key, Yi = xiP , to verify the signature
σi by checking eˆ (σi, P )
?
= eˆ (H2 (idi, vi,jP, TSi) , Yi). The
signature verification proof is as follows:
eˆ (σi, P ) = eˆ (xiH2(idi, vi,jP, TSi), P )
= eˆ (H2 (idi, vi,jP, TSi) , xiP )
= eˆ (H2 (idi, vi,jP, TSi) , Yi))
If the signature is successfully verified, each proxy Pi,j
chooses a random element vj,i ∈ Z∗q and computes vj,iP .
Moreover, Pi,j calculates the long-term seed key Kj,i =
vj,ivi,jP . Finally, it sends the key establishment response
(KERes) packet to SMi. As shown in the figure, the packet
has idj , vj,iP , TSj , H1(Kj,i, 1), σj , and certj , where σj =
xjH2(idj , vj,iP, TSj , H1(Kj,i, 1)), H1() is a hash function
(such as SHA-1), and H1(Kj,i, 1) is used for key confirmation.
When SMi receives the packet, it checks the timestamp and
verifies the signature similar to the verification process done
ܨଵ ൌ ܪଵ ܭ௜,௝, ܶܵ, 1
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⋮
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ܭ௜,௝
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⋮
Fig. 4. Short-term keys computation.
by the proxy. Then, it computes the long-term seed key
Ki,j = vi,jvj,iP = Kj,i. Finally, it sends a key confirmation
packet (KConf ) to Pi,j so that Pi,j knows that SMi has
successfully computed the long-term key.
2) Short-term key computation: The long-term key Ki,j
is used as a seed for the computation of the short-term
keys. First, SMi and Pi,j use the seed key to compute bi-
directional (forward and backward) hash chains as shown in
Fig. 4. For the forward chain, both SMi and Pi,j compute
F1 = H1(Ki,j , TS, 1) where TS is the timestamp. Then,
all the elements of the forward hash chain are computed
using Fa = H1(Fa−1) for 2 ≤ a ≤ T , where T is the
number of short-term keys that need to be stored. Similarly,
the backward hash chain is computed by first computing BT =
H1(Ki,j , TS, 2), then the elements of the backward hash chain
are computed as Bb = H1(Bb+1) for 1 ≤ b ≤ T − 1. Finally,
the short-term key is computed by XORing an element from
the forward chain with the corresponding element from the
backward chain and hashing the result as shown in the figure.
Each short-term key should be used for a short time and after
using all the T keys, the meters can compute a new set of keys
using an updated TS. In this way, the smart meters do not need
to compute and store a large number of keys in each round.
Short-term keys are computed daily and each key should be
used to compute a set of masks. After using the long-term
key for a certain time, SMi and Pi,j should establish a new
long-term seed key, and derive a new set of short-term keys.
V. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section we give the details of EPIC starting by system
setup. Then, we show how SMs report and aggregate power
consumption readings. Finally, we illustrate how the utility
can recover the aggregated reading, verify its integrity, users’
authenticity, and generate electricity bills for each user.
A. System Setup
An offline trusted authority (TA) should bootstrap the sys-
tem as follows. First, the TA generates the bilinear mapping
parameters (q,G1,G2, P, eˆ). It also chooses three different
hash functions. H1 is a regular hash function such as SHA-1,
H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G1, and H is a homomorphic hash function
with the generators {P1, P2, ..., Pd} ∈ G. Furthermore, a
keyed hash function maci,u ← HMACKi,u (h) is selected,
where maci,u is the HMAC on h using the symmetric key
Ki,u. Then, the TA publishes the system public parameters as
pubs = {q, P, P1, P2, ..., Pd,H, H1, H2, HMACK , eˆ}.
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Fig. 5. Example for exchanged messages, stored data, and bottom-up data aggregation.
In addition, every SMi chooses a secret key xi ∈ Z∗q and
computes the corresponding public key Yi = xiP . It should
also obtain a certificate for the public key from a certificate
authority. Finally, each SMi should select several proxies,
assuming that SMi selects αi proxies and be selected by βi
meters to act as a proxy for them, i.e. the total number of
proxies for SMi is λi=αi+βi. Each SM and its proxies should
establish the long-term seed key, derive the short-term keys,
and compute the shared masks as explained in Section IV.
B. Leaf Meters: Report Generation
Each leaf meter SMc (like SM1 and SM2 in Fig. 5) generates
a power consumption report by executing the following steps.
1) Masks its reading rc to obtain a masked reading mc.
mc = rc −
αc∑
j=1
sc,j +
βc∑
j=1
sj,c (1)
2) Hashes its masked reading mc using homomorphic hash
function H( ) to get hc.
hc = H (mc) ≡ H (rc)−
αc∑
j=1
H (sc,j)+
βc∑
j=1
H (sj,c) (2)
3) Computes HMAC on hc using the shared key with the
utility as macc,u = HMACKc,u (hc).
4) Generates a signature σc = xcH2 (mc,macc,u, TS).
Finally, SMc transmits to its parent SMi the following tuple
mc, TS, hc,macc,u, σc (3)
C. Non-leaf Nodes: Data Verification and Report Generation
The operations done by non-leaf meters SMi (like SM3 in
Fig. 5) and the gateway can be divided into two phases. In
the first phase, SMi receives ni messages from its children
and verifies the authenticity and integrity of the received
messages. In the second phase, SMi create a new message
to be transmitted to the next parent. These two phases should
be executed at each non-leaf node until the aggregated masked
reading reaches the utility. The details of the two phases are
as follows.
Phase 1. SMi receives ni messages from each child meter
SMc (1 6 c 6 ni). If the child is a leaf-node, its message
has this format (mc, TS, hc,macc,u, σc) while if the child
is a non-leaf node, the message has the following format
(Mc, TS, h1, h2, . . . , h`c ,MACc, σc) where Mc and MACc
are aggregated masked reading and aggregated MAC com-
puted by the non-leaf chiled SMc as defined in Table II. Also,
the message contains the hashes of the masked readings of
the sub-tree nodes of child SMc. SMi should perform the
following verifications.
1) Perform a batch verification for the received signatures
to make sure that the packets are sent from the intended
meters as follows.
eˆ
(
ni∑
c=1
σc, P
)
?
=
ni∏
c=1
eˆ
(
H2 (Mc,MACc, TS) , Yc
)
(4)
2) Perform a batch verification for all the received hashes
by checking
H
(
ni∑
c=1
Mc
)
?
=
ni∑
c=1
`c∑
j=1
hj (5)
If this verification passes, SMi moves to the next step,
otherwise, data modification attack is detected and SMi
can identify the attacker by applying divide-and-conquer
verification recursively until the attacker is identified.
3) Store the latest received tuple (Mc,MACc, σc) from
every child to help the utility to identify the attacker in
case that the utility detects data modification attack, as
will be explained in the next subsection.
Phase 2. In this phase, SMi should execute the following
steps before sending a reading packet to its parent.
1) Masks its fine-grained reading ri to obtain its own
masked reading mi
mi = ri −
αi∑
j=1
si,j +
βi∑
j=1
sj,i (6)
72) Aggregates its masked reading mi with the masked
readings received from its children meters to generate an
aggregated masked readings Mi as
Mi = mi +
ni∑
c=1
Mc (7)
3) Hashes its masked reading mi using homomorphic hash
function to get hi as
hi = H (mi) ≡ H (ri)−
αi∑
j=1
H (si,j) +
βi∑
j=1
H (sj,i) (8)
4) Computes HMAC on hi with the shared key with the
utility as maci,u = HMACKi,u (hi).
5) Aggregates its MAC with the received aggregated MACs
using XOR operations to obtain MACi = maci,u ⊕
(
⊕ni
c=1MACc).
6) Generates a signature σi = xiH2 (Mi,MACi, TS).
Finally SMi sends to its parent SMpi the following tuple
Mi, TS, h1, h2, . . . , h`i ,MACi, σi (9)
This process of verification and aggregation proceeds in a
bottom-up manner to the utility.
D. Utility: Aggregated Reading Recovery, Data Integrity Ver-
ification and Billing
Data recovery and verification. The utility receives(
Mgw, TS, h1, h2, . . . , h`gw ,MACgw, σgw
)
from the gate-
way. The utility first verifies σgw, homomorphic hashes, and
TS, as described in phase 1 of subsection V-C. Then, it verifies
the aggregated MACgw as follows.
1) Calculates all the individual MACs from the received
hashes
{
mac′u,j = HMACKu,j (hj) , ∀j ∈ {1..`gw}
}
,
2) Calculates the aggregated MAC MAC ′u=
⊕`g
j=1mac
′
u,j .
3) Compares the calculated MAC with received MAC.
MAC ′u
?
=MACgw (10)
If the verification passes, the utility can recover the aggregated
reading of all SMs by removing its masks from Mgw as
follows.
Mgw +
βu∑
j=1
sj,i =
n∑
i=1
ri (11)
where n is the total number of meters in the AMI network.
Attacker identification. If a smart meter SMi modifies both
the aggregated masked reading and a homomorphic hash of
any child in its subtree, i.e., transmits M ′c and h
′
c instead of
Mc and hc to bypass its parent verification done in Equation 5,
then the utility verification done in Equation 10 fails because
MACc was computed by SMc on hc not h′c. In this case,
data modification attack is detected and the utility suspects all
non-leaf SMs since any non-leaf SM can launch this attack.
Therefore, the utility runs the following verifications in a
bottom-up manner, i.e., starting from the first non-leaf nodes
up to the last non-leaf node which is the gateway, until the
attacker is identified.
In order to identify the attacker, the utility should retrieve
SMi children reports (Mc,MACc, σc) 1 ≤ c ≤ ni from SMi
and (Mi,MACi, σi) from SMpi, which is the parent of SMi.
Then, the utility check if
eˆ
(
ni∑
c=1
σc, P
)
?
=
ni∏
c=1
eˆ (H2 (Mc,MACc, TS) , Yc) (12)
If SMi can provide valid signatures from its children, it can
pass the verification done in equation 12, otherwise, SMi
is identified as an attacker. The attacking SM can pass this
verification iff he sends the correct Mc not M ′c, however, it
will be identified by the next verification process.
If the verification in equation 12 passes for all non-leaf
nodes, then the utility should to check the correctness of the
messages sent by each meter SMi. First, the utility extracts
its individual masked reading from the aggregated masked
reading Mi using
m′i =Mi −
ni∑
i=c
Mc
Then, it re-calculates maci,u from the verified masked read-
ings as
mac′i,u = HMACKi,u (H (m′i))
After that, the utility re-calculates maci,u from the verified
aggregated MACs as
mac′′i,u =MACi ⊕
(
ni⊕
c=1
MACc
)
Finally the utility checks if
mac′i,u
?
= mac′′i,u (13)
If the verification fails, SMi is identified as an attacker. This
process continues in a bottom-up manner until the attacker
is identified. The attacker cannot pass this check because he
cannot compute a valid mac value for the modified packet.
This is because the computation of a valid mac value requires
the knowledge of the shared key between the victim meter,
SMc, and the utility. Therefore, EPIC can ensure E2E data
integrity and authenticity without accessing the fine-grained
readings to preserve consumers’ privacy.
Dynamic-pricing-based billing. For dynamic pricing, the
utility can divide the day into periods with different electricity
prices. Assuming that the meters should report w power
consumption readings during each billing period, Table III
gives the w masked readings generated by n meters, where
each column represents the masked readings sent in one time
slot, while each row represents all the masked readings sent
by each meter during the billing period (i.e., w readings). As
explained earlier, the reading ri of SMi at a time slot tx is
masked using the mask
∑αi
j=1 s
(tx)
i,j −
∑βi
j=1 s
(tx)
j,i to produce
the masked reading mi = ri +
∑αi
j=1 s
(tx)
i,j −
∑βi
j=1 s
(tx)
j,i . The
masks should be computed in such a way that the summation
of all the masks used during billing period is zero. This can
be done as follows. At the end of each billing period (report
at tw), the mask SMi should use is equal to the negative
summation of all the previous w − 1 masks plus a billing
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ADDITION OF w MASKED REPORTS OF EACH METER TO OBTAIN THE TOTAL POWER CONSUMPTION DURING BILLING PERIOD.
t1 ... tw−1 tw Billing Period Consumption
SM1 r
(1)
1 +
∑α1
j=1 s
(1)
1,j −
∑β1
j=1 s
(1)
j,1 ... r
(w−1)
1 +
∑α1
j=1 s
(w−1)
1,j −
∑β1
j=1 s
(w−1)
j,1 r
(w)
1 + s
(b)
1,u −
∑w−1
k=1 (
∑α1
j=1 s
(k)
1,j −
∑β1
j=1 s
(k)
j,1 ) s
(b)
1,u +
∑w
k=1 r
(k)
1
...
...
...
...
...
SMn r
(1)
n +
∑αn
j=1 s
(1)
n,j −
∑βn
j=1 s
(1)
j,n ... r
(w−1)
n +
∑αn
j=1 s
(w−1)
n,j −
∑βn
j=1 s
(w−1)
j,n r
(w)
n + s
(b)
n,u −
∑w−1
k=1 (
∑αn
j=1 s
(k)
n,j −
∑βn
j=1 s
(k)
j,n) s
(b)
n,u +
∑w
k=1 r
(k)
n
gw
∑αgw
j=1 s
(1)
gw,j −
∑βgw
j=1 s
(1)
j,gw ...
∑αgw
j=1 s
(w−1)
gw,j −
∑βgw
j=1 s
(w−1)
j,gw −
∑w−1
k=1 (
∑αgw
j=1 s
(k)
gw,j −
∑βgw
j=1 s
(k)
j,gw)
u
∑αu
j=1 s
(1)
u,j −
∑βu
j=1 s
(1)
j,u ...
∑αu
j=1 s
(w−1)
u,j −
∑βu
j=1 s
(w−1)
j,u −
∑w−1
k=1 (
∑αu
j=1 s
(k)
u,j −
∑βu
j=1 s
(k)
j,u)
Total
∑n
i=1 r
(1)
i ...
∑n
i=1 r
(w−1)
i
∑n
i=1 s
(b)
i,u +
∑n
i=1 r
(w)
i
mask, s(b)i,u, shared between the meter and the utility, i.e., the
mask that should be used in the last reading of a billing period
is
s
(b)
i,u −
w−1∑
k=1
 αi∑
j=1
s
(tk)
i,j −
βi∑
j=1
s
(tk)
j,i

so that the summation of all masked readings of SMi gives
the total power consumed by SMi plus the billing mask, i.e.,
w∑
k=1
m
(k)
i =
w∑
k=1
r
(k)
i + s
(b)
i,u
The utility should compute
∑w
k=1 r
(k)
i to bill
SMi. It can use the homomorphic hash property
H(m1 +m2) = H(m1) +H(m2) to compute
∑w
k=1 r
(k)
i as
follows. First, the utility should add all the w homomorphic
hashes sent by SMi in the billing period to obtain
w∑
tx=1
h
(tx)
i = H
(
w∑
k=1
r
(k)
i
)
+H
(
s
(b)
i,u
)
It is clear that only the utility can remove H
(
s
(b)
i,u
)
and hence
only the utility can obtain H
(∑w
k=1 r
(k)
i
)
. Since the range
of the readings is small, the utility can build a look-up table
and obtain the total power consumption of SMi,
∑w
k=1 r
(k)
i ,
from H
(∑w
k=1 r
(k)
i
)
. It should be noted that, it is easy to
obtain
∑w
k=1 r
(k)
i from H
(∑w
k=1 r
(k)
i
)
since all the masks
are canceled and the total consumption of a billing period is
not a large number, but it is extremely hard to obtain mi from
hi since the masks can make mi a large number. Knowing the
power consumption of SMi during the billing period does not
degrade consumers’ privacy because the time period is long
enough to prevent sensitive data leakage [28].
VI. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security properties of EPIC.
In specific, our analysis focuses on how our scheme can collect
power consumption readings with privacy preservation, collu-
sion resistance, authenticity, and E2E integrity verification of
the aggregated reading and identification of attackers.
A. Privacy Analysis
1) Singular Attacks: An adversary, A, can eavesdrop on all
the communications of all the network nodes and can obtain
the individual masked readings of a leaf SM. However, based
on Equation 1, A must know all the λc masks, λc = αc+ βc,
shared between the leaf meter, SMc, and its proxies to be able
to extract the meter’s fine-grained reading. Since no entity
can compute the correct masks except SMc and its proxies,
as explained in subsection IV-B, A cannot obtain the meters’
fine-grained readings.
In the following, we present a formal security proof to show
that the masking technique used in EPIC is semantic secure
against chosen-plaintext attacks even if only one mask value
is used to mask the fine-grained reading.
Theorem 1. The masking scheme is semantically secure
against chosen-plaintext attacks under the pseudorandom
function (PRF) assumption for HMAC.
Proof: The theorem proof as a game is constructed as
follows.
• Initialization: The challenger C is initiated with a set of
one-time secret masks generated as explained in subsec-
tion IV-A using the HMAC function which is used as a
PRF [29].
• Challenge: The adversary A outputs two fine-grained
readings r0 and r1 to C. C chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}
and responds with a ciphertext mb = Enc(rb) = rb + s,
where s is the one-time secret mask and s rb.
• Guess: The adversary A responds with b′ ∈ {0, 1} as a
guess for b. The advantage of the adversary against the
masking in the above game can be defined as
AdvA =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣
Because s rb, s is generated by a PRF and used only
one time, the advantage AdvA in this case becomes
AdvA =
∣∣∣∣12 − 12
∣∣∣∣ = 0
Therefore, the masking scheme is semantically secure and
no adversary can extract the fine-grained reading.
In addition, each mask value is used for only one reporting
period to ensure that the masked readings look different even if
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Fig. 6. The probability an attacker gets at least one reading for n = 200.
the leaf meter reports the same fine-grained reading at different
time slots. Therefore, given two consecutive reports of a meter,
A can not learn if the power consumption has changed or not.
2) Collusion attacks: Unlike the singular attacks launched
by a single adversary, we consider in the following a stronger
attack in which the adversary can collude with other nodes in
the AMI networks.
In EPIC, the fine-grained reading of each meter is protected
by λ secret masks shared with λ proxies. Therefore, for an
attacker to compute the fine-grained reading of a victim meter,
the attacker must collude at least with all the victim’s proxies.
In particular, the attacker can try to recover the fine-grained
reading of a victim meter from either its masked reading or
its homomorphic hash.
To recover the fine-grained reading of a victim leaf meter
from its masked reading, the attacker must collude with all
the victim’s proxies to obtain all secret masks and use them
to get the fine-grained reading from the masked reading given
in Equation 1. If the victim is a non-leaf meter, based on
Equation 7, the attacker must collude with both the victim’s
direct children and proxies.
On the other hand, to recover the fine-grained reading of a
victim meter from its homomorphic hash, based on Equation 2
or 8, the attacker must collude with all the victim’s proxies to
remove the hashes of the secret masks and obtain the H(ri)
from H(mi). Since the value of ri is a small number, the
attacker can build a look-up table and recover ri from H(ri).
In all the previous attack scenarios, the protection level
against collusion attack is determined by the number of
selected proxies λ. Therefore, in the following, we model an
attack and investigate how a proper value for λ can ensure a
satisfactory protection level against collusion attack.
Consider that each SM selects λ proxies, the network has
n nodes, including SMs, the gateway, and the utility, and the
network has m malicious nodes that collude with the attacker.
The probability that a SM selects all the λ proxies from the
m malicious nodes follows the hypergeometric probability
distribution and is given by
mCλ
(n+1)Cλ
Then, the probability that a meter is secure against collusion
attack is
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Fig. 7. Number of proxies vs. network size for P ≤ 0.01.
1−
mCλ
(n+1)Cλ
Let P be the probability that the attacker can recover at least
the readings of any SM in the (n−m) benign meters. P can
be expressed as
P = 1−
n−m∏
i=1
(
1−
mCλ
(n+1)Cλ
)
To assess how hard for the attackers to launch successful
collusion attack in EPIC, Fig. 6 gives P versus m at different
cases of λ for n = 200 SMs. As shown in the figure, if
each SM selects λ = 8 proxies and 60 SMs colludes with the
attacker, the probability that the attacker can obtain at least one
meter’s readings is almost zero. The attacker needs to collude
with 80 SMs, 40% of the SMs in the network, so that the
probability he can get at least one meter’s readings becomes
0.06. If each SM increases the level of protection against
collusion attacks by adding 4 more proxies, i.e. increasing λ
from 8 to 12, the SMs are almost secure when the attacker
colludes with 80 SMs. In this case, the attacker needs to
collude with 120 SMs, 60% of the network, so that P becomes
0.12. We can conclude that, the increase of the number of
proxies (λ) can make collusion attack harder to succeed.
To illustrate how many proxies should be selected by each
SM to be secure against collusion attacks, Fig. 7 shows λ
vs. n such that P ≤ 0.01. We define m/n as the ratio of
malicious nodes in the network. A SM can select a proper
number of proxies to be secure against collusion attack based
on the network size and a risk assessment for the number of
potential malicious meters in the network. For example, for
a network with 100 SMs and 40 SMs of them are malicious,
a SM can be secured by selecting 9 proxies, whereas, if the
network size increases to 2,000 SMs and 800 of them are
malicious, i.e., same m/n ratio, the SM should increase the
number of proxies from 9 to 12 to ensure that the probability of
successful collusion attack is less than 0.01. This indicates that
although the number of SMs significantly increases from 100
to 2,000, a slight increase in the number of proxies is needed
to secure the meters against collusion attacks. Moreover, in an
extreme case in which m/n = 0.6 and n = 2, 000, 22 proxies
are needed to ensure that P ≤ 0.01. We can conclude from
this analysis that SMs can control the protection level against
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collusion attacks by selecting a proper number of proxies,
and the ratio of proxies to the network size (λ/n) is small
to achieve a satisfactory protection against collusion attacks.
B. Security Analysis
1) Data integrity: If an external adversary A manipulates
the transmitted messages between a child meter and its parent,
the attack can be easily detected by the parent because it
can verify the integrity of the received messages by verifying
the received signature. Forging a signature or modifying a
valid signature is infeasible without knowing the private key
of the child meter. In addition, A may record valid packets
exchanged between a meter and its parent (such as the packets
given in (3) and (9) and replay them at later time to disrupt the
reading collection scheme. Since packets have timestamps, the
stale packets can be easily identified and dropped. If A tries to
change the timestamp so that the packet looks fresh, A needs
to know the private key of the victim meter to compute a valid
signature on the packet of the modified timestamp.
Comparing to external attackers, internal attacks can launch
stronger attacks. In particular, they may breach the data
integrity by launching three different attacks: (1) modification
of a child’s homomorphic hash only; (2) modification of a
child’s masked reading only; and (3) modification of both
child’s homomorphic hash and masked reading. Consider SMc
be the victim child, SMi be the malicious parent, and SMpi be
the parent of SMi. SMpi can either detect the attack of SMi or
help the utility to detect the attack. The first two attacks can
be detected by SMpi because the batch verification process
of the individual homomorphic hash values done by SMpi
(given in Equation 5) fails. For the third attack, modification
of both Mc and hc, the utility can detect the attack from
the aggregated MAC verification done in Equation 10. To
identify the malicious SMi, the utility should use the procedure
explained in subsection V-D. Therefore, EPIC can ensure E2E
data integrity without accessing the fine-grained readings to
preserve consumers’ privacy.
2) E2E users’ Authenticity: EPIC achieves hop-by-hop
authentication in which each parent meter can authenticate
the child meters because each packet is signed by the child
meter. Therefore, it is infeasible for A to impersonate meters
by sending packets under their names, and thus parent meters
accept only messages from authenticated children. In addition,
EPIC can also ensure E2E authenticity since the verification
process done by the utility in subsection V-D requires the
use of symmetric keys shared between the utility and each
legitimate user in the AMI network. Therefore, successful
verification process means that the received aggregated reading
was computed from the intended system users.
3) Key agreement: Long-term key agreement. As shown in
Fig. 3, the two parties that run the long-term key agreement
procedure should contribute by random numbers which usually
results in more secure key comparing to computing the key
by one party. The security of the key computation relies on
the hardness of the Discrete-Logarithmic Problem (DLP). If
A eavesdrops on the communication between SMi and Pi,j
given in Fig. 3, he can obtain vi,jP and vj,iP . However, given
TABLE IV
COMPUTATIONAL TIMES AND SIZES FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS.
Cryptographic Operation Time
T1 Pairing e(P1, P2) 1.025 ms
T2 g1 × g2 ∈ G2 (512bit) 1.22 µs
T3 σ1 + σ2 ∈ G1 (512bit) 4.4 µs
T4 H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 0.05 ms
T5 xP1∈ G1 1.44 ms
T6 H(m)∈ G 1.3 ms
T7 h1 + h2∈ G 1.31 µs
T8 HMAC [RFC 2104] (128 bit) 1.58 µs
T9 Modular Exponentiation (1024bit) 5.88 ms
T10 Point Multiplication (1024bit) 1.36 µs
T11 Paillier encryption (1024bits) 19.47 ms
T12 Paillier decryption (1024bits) 18.88 ms
T13 Paillier aggregation (1024bits) 19.9 µs
T14 Paillier Ciphertext Exponentiation 24.25 ms
vi,jP and P , it is computationally infeasible to obtain vi,j .
Therefore, only the involved parties can compute the keys.
Short-term key agreement For backward and forward se-
crecy, as shown in Fig. 4, given the current short-term key,
A can compute neither the past keys nor the future keys.
The only way to compute a correct short-term key is to
have the two corresponding hash values from the forward
and backward chains. Assuming an attacker could obtain a
short-term key K(s)i,j = H1(Fs ⊕ Bs), it is computationally
infeasible to extract Fs ⊕ Bs from K(s)i,j because the hash
function is irreversible. Moreover, if Fs ⊕ Bs is given to A,
it is infeasible to separate them because they are XORed.
Furthermore, assumingA is given an element from the forward
chain Ftx and the corresponding element from the backward
chain Btx , since Ftx is hashed forwardly and Btx is hashed
backwardly, A can compute neither the previous short-term
keys due to the missing forward chain elements nor the future
keys due to the missing backward chain elements.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first evaluate EPIC in terms of the
communication and computation overheads for the single-hop
model, then, we present our ns-3 experiment results to assess
the network performance for the single- and multi-hop models.
A. Computation and Communication Overhead
To evaluate the communication and computation overheads
of EPIC, we implemeted the required cryptographic operations
using Python charm cryptographic library [30] running on an
Intel Core i7-4765T 2.00 GHz and 8 GB RAM. We used
supersingular elliptic curve with the symmetric Type 1 pairing
of size 512 bits (SS512 curve) for bilinear pairing and a
standard elliptic curve secp160r1 for the homomorphic hash
function [31]. All cryptographic operations were run 1,000
times and average measurements are reported in the upper
part of Table IV. Since we compare the overhead of EPIC
to the proposed schemes in [9], [11], [13], we include in the
lower part of Table IV the computation measurements of the
cryptographic operations needed in these schemes.
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Fig. 8. Computation overhead comparison
1) Computation Overhead: The computation overhead is
defined as the processing time required by each node in the
network. These nodes are SMs, the gateway and the utility.
For the single hop model, the time-consuming operations
required by SMs are one homomorphic hash generation which
requires T6; one HMAC generation which requires T8; and
one signature generation which requires T4 + T5. Using the
measurements in Table IV, the total time required by each
meter is 2.79 ms. For n SMs, the computations required by
the gateway are batch signatures verification (as in Eq. 4)
which requires (n + 1)T1 + (n − 1)T2 + (n − 1)T3 + nT4;
batch homomorphic hashes verification (as in Eq. 5) which
requires T6 + (n− 1)T7 ; one homomorphic hash generation
which requires T6; one HMAC generation which requires T8;
and one signature generation which requires T4 + T5. The
total time required by the gateway for these operations is
1.0836n+5.1128 ms. For the utility, one signature verification
operation plus n HMAC computations are required to verify
the received packet and one arithmetic addition operation
to obtain the aggregated reading. These operations require
0.001n + 2.1037 ms. For the schemes in [9], [11], [13],
we followed the same procedure to compute the computation
overhead of each entity and the results are presented in Fig.
8.
As shown in Fig. 8(a), EPIC imposes the least computation
overhead on the SMs comparing to the existing schemes.
This is because EPIC uses efficient masking technique, while
the other schemes use computationally-extensive operations
to encrypt the fine-grained readings. For the gateway, Fig.
8(b) shows that the computational overhead of the gateway
in EPIC is found to be close to those of [11] and [13].
For the computation overhead of the utility, EPIC is more
efficient than the existing schemes because simple arithmetic
addition is needed to remove the utility mask and recover
the aggregated reading as shown in equation 11 , while in
the schemes of [9], [11], [13], time-consuming decryption
operation is needed, as given in the lower part of Table IV. In
addition, as shown in Fig. 8(c), the proposed schemes in [9],
[11], [13] have constant computation time because the utility
decrypts only one aggregated ciphertext regardless of the
number of SMs, whereas in EPIC, the utility’s computation
overhead increases linearly at a rate of 1.31 µs/SM because
the utility receives one homomorphic hash for every SM,
and thus more operations are needed. However, the utility’s
computation overhead of EPIC is much less than those of the
other schemes.
2) Communication Overhead: The communication over-
head is measured by the size of transmitted messages between
the network entities in bytes. In specific, we evaluate SM-to-
Gateway and Gateway-to-Utility communication overhead.
The SM-to-Gateway communication overhead in EPIC can
be computed using the packet format in (3) as follows. Each
SM transmits a 16-byte masked reading, a 4-byte timestamp,
a 20-byte homomorphic hashe, a 16-byte MAC and a 64-
byte signature. Therefore, the total size of a SM’s message
is 120 bytes. For a network of size n, the communication
overhead between all SMs and the gateway is 120n. On the
other hand, the Gateway-to-Utility communication overhead
depends mainly on n which is the total number of SMs in the
network. The total size of the gateway message to the utility
is 20n+ 100 bytes. We used the same procedure to compute
the communication overhead of the proposed schemes in [9],
[11] and [13].
The values of computations and communication overhead
presented in this section were used within the ns-3 simulation
presented in the following subsection.
B. Experiment and Measurement Results
1) Experimental Setup: We used network simulator ns-3.27
[32] to assess the impact of the communication/computation
overhead reduction on the network performance. We imple-
mented a wireless mesh network that mimics the AMI network
using IEEE 802.11s standard. The underlying MAC protocol
is IEEE 802.11g. TCP was used at the transport layer for a
reliable communication, and maximum segment size (MSS) is
536 bytes.
We created grid topologies of size N , where N ∈
{36, 49, 64, 81, 100, 121, 144, 169}. For each N , we ran the
schemes for 30 rounds and average results are reported. One
of the nodes in each topology acts as the gateway while the
other (N − 1) nodes act as smart meters.
At the beginning of each data collection cycle, each meter
reports its power consumption reading to the gateway. We
assumed that the data collection is performed periodically
every 60 seconds [33]. We simulated two different network
models: End-to-End (EtoE) and Hop-by-Hop (HbyH). In EtoE
data collection model, all smart meters simultaneously report
their readings to the gateway directly and multi-hop packet
relay may be needed. In HbyH model, a minimum spanning
tree of the network is created, and parent-child relationships
are assigned.Moreover, in HbyH model, leaf meters send their
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Fig. 9. Computation overhead comparison
readings to their parent meter periodically, the parent meter
aggregates its reading with the readings received from the child
meters, and sends an aggregated reading to their parent meter.
This process goes on up to the gateway. Finally, the gateway
aggregates the readings received from its child meters and
sends an aggregated reading to the utility.
2) Baselines and Performance Metrics: We use three ex-
isting works [9], [11], [13] as baselines to compare the
performance of EPIC. In [9], the meters send their readings
in blinded form, and the data aggregation is performed on
ciphertext. The total power usage can be recovered by com-
puting a discrete log problem. The scheme in [11] uses Pail-
lier cryptosystem to perform data aggregation using partially
homomorphic encryption. This baseline generates larger data
packets when compared to [9]. The last baseline [13] also uses
Paillier cryptosystem, but it differs from [11] in that it uses
two signatures for each report. Hence, [13] introduces extra
overhead.
For performance evaluation, we used the following metrics:
• Average Completion Time (CT): It is the elapsed time
for gathering all the measurement data from all of the
nodes and aggregating them at the gateway in one cycle.
We measure CT at the application layer so that the
cryptographic operations are taken into account.
• Throughput (TP): It is the average amount of data re-
ceived by the gateway per second. This parameter is an
indicator for the bandwidth usage of each scheme, i.e.,
as measurement of this metric increases, as it is worse.
• Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): It is the ratio of the number
of data packets received by the gateway to the number
of data packets that are expected to be received by the
gateway.
3) Simulation Results and Discussions: In Fig. 9(a) and
Fig. 9(d), we present the data collection completion time
values. As the network grows, the time required to complete
a data collection cycle increases. In both data collection
methods, EPIC requires the least time for all topology sizes in
a round because it both has a moderate processing delay for
aggregation and generates comparable size of power readings.
In addition, the approaches require similar amount of time
for data collection until 81-node topologies. Thereafter, the
values dramatically increase for EtoE data collection. This
difference can be attributed to the propagation delay mostly.
It includes backoff waitings due to external collisions while
accessing the medium to transmit the data packets and the path
discovery process performed by the HWMP which is default
routing protocol of IEEE 802.11s standard [34]. The EtoE data
collection typically needs more hops to deliver data packets
to the destination because parent and child meters are one-
hop neighbors of each other in the data reporting hierarchy
trees. Thus, the data packets are exposed to more backoff
waitings on the path towards the destination. This results in a
dramatic increase in EtoE data collection. Also, we would like
to point out the remarkable difference between [13] and the
other approaches. Although [13] takes shorter than [9] does
to perform cryptographic operations, it incurs an extra delay
due to the segmentation by TCP at the transport layer. Since
[13] generates larger data packets than MSS, a power reading
is transmitted in multiple segments, which results in an extra
delay due to the extra backoff waitings.
It can be seen that in HbyH data collection that the
approaches require far less time to complete a data collec-
tion round. Also, they have similar values for all topology
sizes. Since parent and child meters are one-hop neighbor
of each other, the backoff waitings decrease thanks to less
competition in medium access. EPIC slightly outperforms the
other approaches. It always requires less time than the other
approaches do to complete a data collection round. Although it
incurs similar processing delay for aggregation and generates
larger aggregated readings beyond a level of the hierarchy tree
towards the gateway, it requires the least time. This is because
EPIC takes advantage of far shorter propagation delays below
that level thanks to smaller aggregated power readings [35].
Secondly, we analyze the throughput performance to discuss
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the bandwidth usage of the approaches. As shown in Fig.
9(b) and Fig. 9(e), the approaches produce more throughput
at the gateway in the EtoE data collection when compared to
the throughput values for the HbyH data collection. This is
because power readings are aggregated at some intermediate
meters in the HbyH model. Hence, average amount of data
received by the gateway decreases. [13] produces the most
throughput in both the EtoE and HbyH data collection methods
since it generates the biggest data packets compared to the
others. It is followed by [11] and [9], respectively. EPIC
produces the least throughput because it generates the smallest
data packets for power readings. The TP values linearly
increase in EtoE data collection because the number of power
readings delivered to the gateway increases as the network
grows. However, in HbyH data collection, the throughput that
EPIC produces at the gateway linearly increases while the
others remain constant although the number of power readings
reported by each approach is the same at each topology
size. The additional overhead is required to achieve E2E
data integrity, authenticity and dynamic pricing that are not
achieved in the other schemes.
We investigate the PDR values in order to find out how
reliable the schemes are. As shown in Fig. 9(c) and Fig. 9(f),
all schemes achieve more than 89% PDR. While the schemes
can achieve 100% at each topology size in the HbyH data
collection, the values slightly decrease after 81-node topology
in the EtoE data collection. This is due to the loss of one
of three-way handshake messages between the gateway and
a physically distant node (especially the nodes at the edge
of the network) in the network. The TCP is a connection-
oriented communication protocol, so it needs to establish a
connection before sending data packets. As the number of hops
between the hosts increases, it is more likely to lose any of
the three-way handshake messages. Since there is a limit to
retransmit these messages, it is likely to fail a connection. If
the connection fails, the data packets cannot be transferred,
and this results in lower PDR values.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed EPIC, an efficient privacy-
preserving scheme with E2E data integrity verification and
collusion-resistance for AMI networks. In EPIC, each meter
selects a number of meters in the network called “proxies”
and efficiently computes and shares pairwise secret mask with
each proxy. Then, each meter should send the utility a masked
power consumption reading. After aggregation, all masks are
canceled and the utility can only obtain an aggregated reading
to preserve consumers privacy. In addition, EPIC enables the
utility to verify the integrity of the aggregated reading and
identify the attackers without accessing the individual readings
to preserve privacy. The utility can also generate electricity
bills based on dynamic prices without violating consumers’
privacy. A formal security proof, and a probabilistic model
are provided to demonstrate that EPIC can preserve the con-
sumers’ privacy with E2E data integrity and high protection
against collusion attacks. Moreover, we evaluated the perfor-
mance of EPIC using ns-3 and the measurements demonstrated
that EPIC is efficient when compared to similar existing
schemes and can collect periodic power consumption data in
the AMI network without consuming excessive bandwidth so
that the other types of traffic can obtain more bandwidth.
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